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114 matter for contempt. Those who thought that they might succeed, while remaining within the Eastern bloc, in keeping clear of total orthodoxy and maintaining some degree of freedom of thought, have been defeated. The peasants' leaders were defeated, Masaryk was defeated, the socialists who tried to collaborate were defeated, Rajk was defeated in Hungary, Gomulka in Poland.

My mother tongue, work in my mother tongue, is for me the most important thing in life. And my country, where what I wrote could be printed and could reach the public, lay within the Eastern Empire. My aim and purpose was to keep alive freedom of thought in my own special field; I sought in full knowledge and conscience to subordinate my conduct to the fulfillment of that aim. I served abroad because I was thus relieved from direct pressure and, in the material which I sent to my publishers, could be bolder than my colleagues at home. I did not want to become an émigré and so give up all chance of taking a hand in what was going on in my own country. The time was to come when I should be forced to admit myself defeated.

• 668 114 To understand the course of events in Eastern and Central Europe during the first post-war years, it must be realized that pre-war social conditions called for extensive reforms. It must further be understood that the Nazi rule had occasioned a profound disintegration of the existing order of things. In these circumstances, the only hope was to set up a social order which would be new, but would not be a copy of the Russian regime. So what was planned in Moscow as a stage on the road to servitude, was willingly accepted in the countries concerned as though it were true progress. Men will clutch at illusions when they have nothing else to hold to.

The Method, the Diamat—that is, dialectical materialism

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as interpreted by Lenin and Stalin—possesses a strong magnetic influence on the men of the present day. In the people's democracies, the communists speak of the "New Faith," and compare its growth to that of Christianity in the Roman Empire. There has been instituted in France a group of worker-priests, who do regular work in the factories and bring the Gospel to the laboring masses while sharing fully in their living conditions. A large proportion of these men have abandoned Catholicism and been converted to communism. This example illustrates the intensity of the ideological struggle which is going on today. And let it be remembered that in the people's democracies indoctrination is enforced by the whole power of the State.

For several years I carried on a debate with those of my friends who were yielding, little by little, to the magic influence of the New Faith. The debate went on in my own mind also—more than a debate indeed, since that word gives no sense of the emotional stress which I experienced. As the nerve-centers of the country were mastered, one after the other, by the adherents of Moscow, I was forced to abandon my philosophic beliefs one after another, if I was to keep from throwing myself into the abyss. The abyss for me was exile, the worst of all misfortunes, for it meant sterility and inaction.

In the end, I found myself driven to the point where a final choice had to be made. This was when "socialist realism" was introduced into Poland. This is not, as some think, merely an esthetic theory to which the writer, the musician, the painter or the theatrical producer is obliged to adhere. On the contrary, it involves by implication the whole Leninist-Stalinist doctrine. If writers and painters are not forced to become members of the Party, that is because such a step is unnecessary. So long as they act in ac-

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[608] cordance with "socialist realism," they are automatically and inescapably enrolled among the followers of Stalin. "Socialist realism" is much more than a matter of taste, of preference for one style of painting or music rather than another. It is concerned with the beliefs which lie at the foundation of human existence. In the field of literature it forbids what has in every age been the writer's essential task—to look at the world from his own independent viewpoint, to tell the truth as he sees it, and so to keep watch and ward in the interest of society as a whole. It preaches a proper attitude of doubt in regard to a merely formal system of ethics but itself makes all judgment of values dependent upon the interest of the dictatorship. Human sufferings are drowned in the trumpet-blare: the orchestra in the concentration camp; and I, as a poet, had my place already marked out for me among the first violins.

Look, then, dispassionately at my problem. At home in Poland, my friends, my relatives, theaters where my translations of Shakespeare were being produced, publishers ready to print what I wrote. Above all, my own country and my own language—what is a poet who has no longer a language of his own? All these things were mine, if I would pay the price: obedience.

The actual moment of my decision to break with the Eastern bloc could be understood, from the psychological point of view, in more ways than one. From outside, it is easy to think of such a decision as an elementary consequence of one's hatred of tyranny. But in fact, it may spring from a number of motives, not all of them equally high-minded. My own decision proceeded, not from the functioning of the reasoning mind, but from a revolt of the stomach. A man may persuade himself, by the most logical reasoning, that he will greatly benefit his health by

CHAPTER III

THE TRANSFER OF THE SYSTEM

1. *The Communist Seizure of Power*

"The assumption of totalitarian power by the Communist Parties of Eastern Europe in the years immediately following the Second World War was characterized throughout by a degree of administrative caution and bureaucratic circumlocution contrasting sharply with the bold tactics of early Leninist Communism. Where Lenin advocated the forthright "smashing" of the old State apparatus, the new generation of Communist tacticians favored its piecemeal suffocation and gradual substitution of a new regime. Where Lenin's Party proudly proclaimed its victory as a sharp historical break with the past,[1] the East European Communists made painstaking efforts to represent themselves as the legitimate heirs of national tradition.[2] And while Lenin's Party seized power on the crest of a giant revolutionary wave—culminating in the "Ten Days that Shook the World"—the East European Parties, operating in a virtual revolutionary vacuum, gingerly infiltrated their way into State power by diplomatic pressures, police intrigues, bureaucratic manipulations, and the implied threat of a foreign army.[3]

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[1] The efforts these regimes made in the post-war years to maintain the fiction of legal and constitutional *continuity* with their predecessors also fit into this pattern. Indeed, with the possible exception of Czechoslovakia, it is impossible to establish a precise year – such as 1917 in Soviet history – when the Communists seized power.

[2] The East European Communist regimes frequently stress their *native* origins, and pose as the culmination of thousand-year-old national strivings. For example: the Czechoslovak Communist, Vaclav Kopecky, proclaimed at an ideological conference on February 27th, 1952, that "we Communists today are fulfilling the wishes of all true patriots of past generations. We are the heirs of the Hussite idea, and we are faithful to the highest traditions of the Czech and Slovak people." The very fact that the East European regimes were founded in the midst of intense Pan-Slavic and anti-Teuton demonstrations offers a key to their political psychology.

[3] The contrast may be put very succinctly: while the East European Communist Parties could not have seized power without the aid of the powerful Red Army, the Russian Bolsheviks retained power despite the intervention of several foreign armies.

Indeed, there is considerable evidence to show that the Communists preferred to take power without the aid of genuinely revolutionary movements. The calculated policy of permitting the Nazis to destroy the powerful non-Communist but leftist Polish underground in Warsaw was one indication of the Communist fear of spontaneous and deeply rooted reform movements. As Mitrany points out, "When the Soviet armies first occupied territory in Eastern peasant countries, they did not attempt to use the peasants against the existing regime";[4] instead they concentrated on seizing the centers of political power through which, in time, they were to introduce land reform by official fiat.

This wide divergence in revolutionary tactics between 1917 and 1944-45 arose from two factors. First, the spontaneous revolutionary forces in Eastern Europe were so weak that the Communists, with the aid of onrushing armies, could either defeat them or take them over. Second, the internal bureaucratization of the Communist movement which has occurred since Lenin's day made it imperative that the Communists rely primarily upon their own organization to affect events rather than upon the power of mass human forces. Consequently, they eschewed raising revolutionary slogans and adopted only those slogans which would help ease the path to organizational control.

These differences are of crucial importance in understanding the general course which the "East European Revolution" took, and the particular character of its agricultural policy.

Although Lenin's seizure of political power in 1917 was accompanied by a vast peasant-made reform of the Russian land system, he did not sanctify it with affirmations of his belief in independent peasant farming, as his more cynical East European successors were to do nearly 30 years later. Indeed, by decreeing nationalization of the land immediately after assuming power, Lenin made it clear that he considered individual peasant management of the land a transitional stage.[5] Consequently, Bolshevik policy shifts in the

[4] Mitrany, p. 179.

[5] Theoretical opposition to the land reform as a serious solution to the agrarian problem remained a part of the international Communist policy throughout the twenties, and was abandoned only after the policy shift to the Popular Front (1934-35). Even in the Far East, where the urban proletariat was very small, Comintern agents adhered to this general line. Only in the early thirties, under Mao Tse-tung's leadership, did the Communists in the Far East begin to appreciate the revolutionary potential in the slogan of land reform. During the Popular Front era, when the Communists allied themselves with a variety of previously prohibited groups in Europe and elsewhere, they accustomed themselves to the demagogic opportunism they practiced with such skill after the Second World War. (See Franz Borkenau, *World Communism*, New York, 1939).

661 well-to-do peasants had survived the post-war reforms, the size of this group was minuscule compared to the propaganda concentrated upon it. As the collectivization drive gained momentum, it became increasingly clear that the slogan of the "struggle to liquidate the kulaks" was largely an ideological cover under which a general onslaught against the entire peasantry was being waged.

"The distinguishing feature of this [agricultural] revolution," Stalin once said concerning Soviet collectivization, "is that it was accomplished *from above*, on the initiative of the State, directly supported *from below* by the millions of peasants."[19] His formula was designed to distinguish the "agricultural revolution" from the "socialist revolution" of 1917, which presumably took its initiative *from below*. Therefore, one may assume that the emphasis in his formula is to be placed on its first clause (from above) rather than on the second (from below). The constant state of tension between the peasantry and the State in the years of collectivization is testimony to the reluctance of the peasantry to believe that the drive to "liquidate the kulaks" was being waged in their favor.

● [668] The means by which the peasants expressed their antagonism to the agricultural policy were varied and the material on them is voluminous. The Romanian Party organ, *Scanteia*, described the forms which peasant resistance took in this fashion:

> At the present time, the resistance of the capitalist elements [the peasantry] in our country takes various forms: the sabotage of the cultivation and sowing plan, the refusal to complete compulsory delivery quotas and to pay taxes, plotting against the collective farms and peasant partnerships, black market operations and artificially raising prices – going so far as the communication of rumors of the criminal character of arson and murder.[20]

But the most direct evidence of the failure of Communist propaganda to win peasant support for collectivization was the economic apathy of the peasants and the continued impatience and fury of Communist propaganda. Since the regimes did not themselves resort to outright violence, neither did the peasants. But to the policy of slow economic suffocation the peasants countered a policy of passive resistance traditional among the backward peasantry of Eastern Europe.

3. *The Economic Strategy of Collectivization*

423 The effort to transform the East European countryside was

[19] *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Short Course)*. (International Publishers, New York, 1939), p. 305.
[20] Scanteia (Bucharest), April 12, 1953.

423 ance to collectivization which only a party of the strong Soviet type could have withstood.

However, those factors which made "salami tactics" suitable for the seizure of power and the beginning of collectivization made them inappropriate for completion of the task and the final subjugation of the independent peasantry. These disadvantages may be summarized as follows:

423 1. Piecemeal collectivization encouraged a type of peasant ●668 resistance which, it turned out, was more effective than Soviet peasant resistance. In the USSR collectivization took place so rapidly, and with such tremendous force, that the vast majority of peasants were already well enclosed within the "Socialist sector" by the time a full-scale counter-attack could be prepared. Leonard Hubbard, the English authority, described the Soviet victory in this way:

> The struggle over collectivization ended distinctly in favour of the Soviet Government, unlike the conflict [between the Government and the peasantry] that brought War Communism to a close. The peasants were no longer able to starve the Government into yielding, because the Government had now created an efficient organisation for obtaining the foodstuffs necessary for subsistence of the urban and industrial population.[18]

While it is true that the Soviet peasantry, in retaliation, destroyed a good portion of the nation's livestock, their bargaining power was not improved as a result. The vital shipments of surplus grain were insured, and all means of resistance had been thoroughly destroyed. The famine of 1932-33, mainly affecting the grain-growing regions of Ukraine and South Russia, demonstrated beyond doubt that, in Hubbard's words, "if anybody was to starve, [the peasants] would be the first to do so."

423 In Eastern Europe, however, the slow, cautious collectivization 661 precluded the possibility of so calculated and brutal a policy. A sufficient proportion of the peasantry remained outside of the "Socialist sector" to wreak havoc with the Government's general economic plan. The East European regimes could not gain a strong enough position in relation to the peasantry to withstand the tremendous pressures which would be generated by rapid collectivization or a disastrous drought such as 1933. One poor harvest was, consequently, a sufficient jolt to destroy the entire rhythm of the

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[18] Leonard Hubbard, *The Economics of Soviet Agriculture*, London, 1939, p. 123.

Satellite industrial program. The oustanding case in point is, of course, Hungary, whose extremely poor harvest of 1952 provided the impetus which paved the way for the crisis of 1953.[19]

2. The reliance upon slow economic strangulation rather than direct administrative force in collectivization inevitably meant greater reliance on the voluntary will of the peasantry than was necessary in the Soviet collectivization drive. Therefore, the regimes had to take some account of the individual tastes of the peasantry. The variety of intermediate types of collective, the special privileges granted kolkhoz members, reflect the Communist desire to soften the impact of collectivization.[20] The strenuous efforts made to demonstrate to the peasant the economic superiority of collectivism were also part of this effort.

This policy made collectivization possible but at the same time detracted from the very usefulness originally intended for the collectivized farms; that is, the effort to render the collectives attractive to the independent peasant (limited as they were) did not facilitate exploitation of the peasants which was their major economic justification. As was evident from the analysis presented in Chapted IV, the degree of exploitation of the "Socialist sector" was not much greater than the exploitation of the private sector. The difference was, in any case, smaller than that achieved in the Soviet Union, where a prolonged period of persuasion and intra-peasantry discrimination had been unnecessary.

4. *The East European Peasant*

Peasant resistance is a social force extremely difficult to measure either quantitatively or qualitatively. It expresses itself in many forms and guises, both in open revolt and passive resistance. This is partly because peasant sentiment rarely expresses itself in organizational form but more commonly in individual economic acts. In modern history, governments have found it difficult to elicit fanatical loyalty from the peasant; at best he is obedient. For the same reasons, the peasant has rarely been drawn into the organized revolutionary movements of the time. He has succumbed to few

[19] There was, of course, other factors involved in the Hungarian agricultural crisis of 1953 (see above pp. 109-10).

[20] Mention should be made here of Communist efforts throughout the sphere to flatter the peasant by a superficial glorification of his traditional dance, costumes, handiwork, and other expressions of the peasant culture which once graced the covers of pre-World War II East European tourist guides.

565 of the sophisticated slogans of modern politics and tends to judge
829 governments in terms of provincial and pragmatic considerations
668 which cannot be encompassed in the romantic slogans of either the State or the Revolution. For a fleeting moment in 1917, the peasants of Russia involved themselves in the maelstrom of a proletarian revolution. Between the wars they gave occasional support to genuinely peasant parties, but invariably their interest lagged or the parties betrayed them. Otherwise, the peasants have in general been passive rather than active participants in 20th Century political history.

The vast uprising of the Russian peasants in 1917-18 was probably their greatest show of strength in the 20th century, and certainly absorbed more peasant energies and resentments than either the 1907 Romanian rebellion or the Bulgarian peasant victories of the early 1920s. But their victory was short-lived, and was achieved at a tremendous price. The cataclysmic forces of the Russian Revolution so shattered the old structure of both countryside and city that the gains the peasant made remained at the mercy of terrible forces. The destruction of traditional institutions which occurred in 1917-21 in defense of the Revolution prepared the land for the collectivization onslaught 10 years later.

The peasants of Eastern Europe have not participated in such a revolution, and their institutions knew no such cataclysmic overturn. Furthermore, East European peasants have had a longer tradition of private property and as a result were less capable of revolutionary opposition to their oppressors but more capable of that type of passive resistance which in the long run is most effective. Russian peasants might destroy the livestock in defiance of the Bolshevik cadres but East European peasants could more easily sabotage the plan by day-to-day non-cooperation. The revolutionary traditions of the Russian peasantry made possible greater heroism, but no greater improvement of their economic situation. The less militant traditions of the East European peasantry (in part the consequence of more humane governments) guaranteed that there would be no repetition of the victories of 1917-18, nor any exact repetition of the terrible defeats of 1929-32.

There are many national factors affecting the total picture: the proximity of peasant victory in Hungary of 1945-46; the power of the Catholic Church in rural Poland; the relative prosperity of the Czech farmers; the communal traditions of the Bulgarian and

Yugoslav peasants; the special position which Romania occupies in the Soviet empire. These differences are important, and explain many of the variations within the framework of agricultural policy. But these variations fall into that historical experience which distinguishes East European peasantry from its Russian counterpart. These historical differences are of the utmost importance in explaining the failure of the East European Communists to emulate successfully the Soviet example.

5. *The Communist Role in Eastern Europe*

The Communist Parties of Eastern Europe consider themselves progressive forces of the area. In agriculture, they assert that by lifting the backward peasantry out of its traditional lethargy and provincialism, they are performing a service for the peasants and the entire society. The opposition of the peasantry to Communist plans for the rationalization of the land stems from stubborn allegiance to outmoded customs and habits. Vulko Chervenkov, the Bulgarian Premier, gave the classical formulations on this point:

> The Bulgarian peasant has two souls. One is the love of work and the other is the sense of private ownership. His spirit of private ownership brings him close to the capitalist. His spirit of work brings him close to the working class. Therefore the peasant is hesitant. We Communists, through our tactics and by the collective method, should kill their spirit of private ownership and build our socialist world.[19]

It is precisely this conception of the Communist role in Eastern Europe which the material gathered together here calls into question.

No doubt it is partly true that peasant resistance to collectivization is based on their passionate attachment to the land they till and own. But as has been pointed out, the major issue in the struggle between the Communists and the peasants was the question of the *distribution* of the fruits of the land, rather than the more abstract question of conflicting ideologies.

The peasants fight not only to protect their ancient traditions but even more to protect their economic rights, and they frequently employ the ancient traditions in defense of their own economic interests. The Communists, for their part, struggle against these traditions not merely out of doctrinaire antagonism but because these customs stand in the way of further exploitation of the

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[19] *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia) September 9, 1953.

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161 These figures are subject to correction, but are adequate for the present purpose. They indicate that the population of Stamford, Connecticut, could be multiplied into this total subjected European population about fourteen hundred times. That is, every man, woman, and child in such a community has fourteen hundred counterparts over there. Fourteen hundred Stamfords with its schools and churches, its jails and railroad station, its doctors and lawyers, its butchers and bakers, its little children and its grandfathers—all of them, every day and every night, first under the heel of Hitler and then under the heel of Stalin. 668 And every living soul has been steeped in a bath of propaganda for twelve years, one version being that there exists a master race, and another that "Anglo-American imperialism" does an endless series of misdeeds, such as sending potato bugs to Eastern Germany and disease-spreading insects to Korea. He may not believe all this, but he must not say so even to himself.

For the nerve center of this propaganda is terror. The Communist always begins with the devices of infiltration. These he is taught to handle adroitly. He can take over a labor union almost before its members suspect that he has any desire to do so. In the presence of liberals he can be a boon companion, and discreetly assent to his neighbor's views about Whitehead or St. Thomas Aquinas. But when the Russian Army is on hand to support him he is camouflaged only moderately. Everyone knows that his bosses have arrived from Moscow after a period of intensive training. But so long as "imperialist powers" are in relative control he appreciates each and every opportunity to pretend that he is some one else.

668 697 He uses the radio and the newspaper, the friendly gathering of citizens, and the picture magazine. But the instrumentalities upon which he really relies are the secret police and the concentration camp. The police are not primarily there to ferret out plots. It is their business to cajole a vast army of informers

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into thinking that if they report the conversations and the past histories of others they themselves will be able to keep their skins relatively intact. The concentration camp is, however, the Communists' trump card. Anyone who causes trouble can be sent to one, and the supply is unlimited. The existence of such camps is, to be sure, so well known to the average person outside the Russian orbit that mention of them arouses relatively little interest. How many remember any longer the names of Dachau and Auschwitz?

Nevertheless the concentration camps operated by the Russians are very serious matters even to Americans, and may the Lord forbid that we ever get into them. But if we suppose that Thomas Murphy of Dubuque, Iowa, proprietor of a stationery store, were suddenly put into one before his wife could get much more than his toothbrush into his briefcase, we shall have a fairly good idea of what has been happening to hundreds of thousands of poor people in Eastern Europe for a long time and to all Central Europeans since 1945.

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We know rather less about Russia's slave-labor camps than, perhaps, we should; but even so the information is considerable. Some of what is known comes from sources which cannot be divulged. A good deal has also been supplied by persons who once resided in such camps. The system as such is thirty years old, though it has probably never been so extensive and well organized as it now is. Two purposes are served by it, which we may assume are those which the Nazis also posited as goals, even if their social objectives and methods were in some respects different from those of the Communists. Human beings can be used as beasts of burden in carrying out enterprises sponsored by the government. Secondly, if anyone is suspected of disloyalty, "sabotage," or difference of opinion, he can be removed from normal social life. Soviet society is a Gargantuan feat of human engineering. In the present state of tech-

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795 Protestantism than were those of Roman Catholicism. Luther-
659 ans, for example, were not averse to identifying their Church with a political power; but their belief that the Kingdom of God and the kingdoms of this world are radically different also led to the conclusion that the Church could accept responsibility for approving or opposing actions by the State only when these controverted directly the moral and religious truths which had been made explicit in the teachings of the Lord Jesus. Thus a section of the German Lutheran Church opposed Nazism with sublime courage because Hitler had repudiated in principle such central teachings as that of the validity of Christian baptism when administered to persons of Jewish origin.

795 But Protestants viewed with uneasiness the Catholic practice
668 of creating organizations of the faithful for political and social action—which led in Germany to the creation of the Center Party on the basis of organizational efforts that had their origin in 1840. This was by no means merely an opportunistic reaction, even though upon occasion ecclesiastical rivalry may have played a part. While some loyal Protestants cooperated with and even voted for the Center Party, even as did a number of Jews, the great majority felt—no doubt, upon occasion, quite properly—that partisan activity brought the Church into realms where religious teaching was compromised for the sake of political expediency. This cleavage was intensified after Karl Barth and his associates formulated a neo-orthodox theology whose profound influence extended beyond Germany to Calvinism and Lutheranism in the whole of Eastern Europe. How strongly this criticism affected Catholic practice cannot be discussed here; but it may be pointed out that, during much of the Pontificate of Pius XI, Rome contemplated withdrawing the faithful completely from organizations of a political and social character, and building up instead the groups which received the generic name Catholic Action. Only toward the close of his

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Pontificate did Pius XI reaffirm the desirability of the more secular associations. And in Germany after World War II Catholics elected to create an interconfessional party, the Christian Democratic Union, instead of resurrecting the old Center Party (which emerged as a small minority movement only).

In any event, wide circles of the clergy and the laity looked upon the Russian Church with deep if sometimes nostalgic respect, particularly when the yearning for the reunion of Christendom was spiritually motivated and sincere. Despite many efforts, the outlook for an eventual peace with the Roman See which would obliterate the divisive past seemed to be unpromising. And on the other hand the "Social Christianity" to which American Protestantism appeared to be irretrievably committed impressed the more traditional European theologians as being thin and relatively mundane. There remained the hope that by forging a bond with the Orthodox East a new Christian community, transcending national boundaries, could be established. The writings of Russian exiles were read with avidity; and the authors were of such talent, insight, and sometimes genius that they exerted a great influence. There can be no doubt that, if after victory in 1945 Stalin had adopted a conciliatory policy and had conceded genuine religious and social freedom, Central and Eastern Europe would have become strongly, even ardently pro-Russian. The response in Protestant communities would have been particularly sincere.

The hope for such a policy was at times as fervent as a messianic dream, and it died hard. Pastor Martin Niemoeller has perhaps been its most eloquent exponent, but there have been many others. It is not possible to understand fully the situation that developed unless one bears these things in mind. Only with great difficulty could Europe resign itself to accepting the intellectual and cultural leadership of the United States. This sobering thought may also be a healing one.

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423 when a peasant leaves the agricultural co-operative, he is
474 allowed, at least according to the law, to detach or sell the property he contributed or the plot he received in exchange.

On the other hand there are two factors which will render the results of 'collectivisation' in the satellites more severe than in Russia: 1. As we have seen, the increase in the grain output which followed upon 'collectivisation' in Russia was due in the main to the great extension of the area cultivated; but such an extension is out of the question in the countries of Eastern Europe. 2. Although Eastern Europe is not as suitable for meat and milk production as Western Europe, but, like Russia, is much better for growing corn, it already has many more branches than Russia of intensive farming (milk, pork, vegetables, wines, tobacco, etc.) whose prosperity is dependent on the existence of an urban population with a high and rising standard of living. The present regimes do not augur well for such a development.

Peasant Resistance

423 Although 'collectivisation' has hardly begun in the 'People's
474 Democracies', the agricultural policy of the governments has
668 already met with a peasant resistance which is on the increase. It is partly resistance to requisitioning and a protest against the lack of industrial goods and partly resistance to 'collectivisation' (of course these two reasons cannot be separated in practice).

Just as it was natural that the resistance of the working class to the industrial policy of the governments of Eastern Europe appeared earliest and was strongest in Czechoslovakia, the most industrialised country in the region (except for the Soviet Zone of Germany and Austria), so is it natural that the peasant resistance to their agricultural policy is boldest in Bulgaria. The reasons for this are: first, Bulgaria is the country least affected by the land reform, so that the peasants have not much to thank the Government for on this score; secondly, Bulgaria has the highest percentage of peasants engaged in small-scale intensive farming—tobacco, grapes, roses—so that the inducement needed to break their opposition to

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'collectivisation' is the greatest; thirdly, the basis upon which the industrialisation of the country is taking place is the weakest (except for Albania), and the industrialisation plan is the most ambitious (except for Yugoslavia), so that the need to squeeze the peasant is the most desperate.* This last point is clearly illustrated by the targets of the various Plans, all of which aim at the 'collectivisation' of only a minority of the peasants—except the Bulgarian plan, which by 1953 aims to have 60 per cent of the peasants in co-operative farms.

The peasant resistance took the characteristic form of non-delivery of their quota of products. Despite the good harvest in 1948, by October 10th only one district had delivered its quota, 13 districts had delivered between 80 and 90 per cent, but many more had not even fulfilled half the quota. (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, organ of the Communist Party, October 15th and 17th, 1948). 1948 was bad enough, but 1949 was much worse. The sowing quotas were nowhere near completion on the final date, March 15th. Only 56 per cent of the wheat quota was completed, 45 per cent of the rye, 55 per cent of the barley, 51 per cent of the oat, and 14 per cent of the sunflower quotas. (*Otechestven Front*, 25th March, 1949). The Ministry of Agriculture reported that many villages met great obstacles in collecting grain. In the village of Dimitrievo, for instance, the Village Council showed no effort to fulfil its duty and barely 1,200 kilos of grain were turned in. The co-operative of Yaborovo village refused to give up its allocation. Many villages had very inadequate granaries, etc., etc. (*Otechestven Front*, 31st July, 1949).

That even members of the Communist Party were taking part in the resistance of the peasantry to the Government's agricultural policy was made clear in Dimitrov's speech at the Fifth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party (December 19th, 1948): 'In some villages there were "Party members" and even Party leaderships who did not head the campaign for ensuring food to the people and even de facto sabotaged the delivery of cereals. The same holds true for some village Communists who do not help and sometimes impede the creation

*Yugoslavia, too, did not undergo an extensive land reform, and its very ambitious plan for industrialisation is also based on a very low technical level. But there the peasants are much more tolerant towards the government, because of the threat of Moscow to it.

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423 of co-operative farms'. (G. Dimitrov, *Political Report to Fifth*
474 *Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party*, Sofia, 1948, p. 80).*
● 668 The extent of the peasant resistance and its causes were admitted to at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party on June 11th and 12th, 1949, where in an excess of 'Bold Self-Criticism', the Party laid bare its 'mistakes' and promised to relax its stringent policy towards the peasantry.

Shortly before the Plenum the Acting-Premier had said that 'no progress was registered since September 9th, 1944, in the output of cereals despite the import of tractors and other agricultural machinery and considerable agro-technical improvements'.

One of the reports to the Plenum says:

'We must admit that we have fastened the screw too tightly in our relations with the medium farmer . . . We must unloosen the screw and switch over to methods which will induce the farmer and especially the medium peasant, by an appeal to his self-interest, to improve and increase his production.'

The Plenum Resolution says:

'Excesses have occurred in the system of quota purchases, which have led to the requisitioning of practically the entire

*Two years later, in his report to the Plenum of the Central Committee (7th and 8th October, 1950) the new General Secretary, Vulko Chervenkov, gave many more details about the sabotage of the agricultural deliveries by Communist Party members and organisations. He said: ' . . . the former Minister of Home Trade last year, under pressure of various appeals from local organs, arbitrarily, quite irresponsibly, without the permission of the Central Committee of the Party and the Government, reduced three and a half times the plan for state grain deliveries. He was unable to grasp the fact that the appeals of the local organs reflected the pressure of private landowners and kulaks against the interests of the state.' ' . . . the party organisations in the districts of Bourgas, Gorna Oryakhovitsa, Rousse and Kolarovgrad . . . yielded to the pressure of a number of primary organisations which expressed private and kulak interests and attempted to wreck the plan for collecting the deliveries . . . ' The same crimes are attributed by Chervenkov to the first secretary of the Stalin District Party Committee, the vice-chairman of its People's Council and the representative of the Central Committee of the Party and Government whose special task was to inspect the collection of the state grain deliveries in the district. 'The District Party Committee and the District People's Council' of the Pleven district 'fell into the hands of the kulaks'; 'the inspector of the Central Committee of the Party attached to the Pleven district played an unenviable role'. In every possible way he supported the local leadership in its 'attempt to attain a reduction of the plan . . . ' The same crimes are attributed to the leadership of the Party and People's Council in Vratsa district and the representative of the Central Committee there, Dimiter Dimov, who was at the same time a secretary of the Central Committee of the Party and a member of the Political Bureau. And this happened after the big 'purge' of 'Kostovists' in 1949!

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marketable part of the produce at fixed low prices. This applies especially to grain farmers, who constitute the huge majority of our peasantry. In this way agricultural producers have been to a large extent deprived of their personal interest in developing and increasing production, improving its quality and generally raising the productivity of agricultural labour . . .'

'In the formation of the co-operative farms, instead of strict compliance with the laws, Government directives and Party instructions, throughout almost the whole country there have been irresponsbile requisitionings of the best and most favourably located land, which is incorporated in the co-operative areas, while the private farmers are given in exchange distant and barren plots. Farmers are not being compensated in accordance with the quantity and real value of the land.'

'. . . peasants are forced to join co-operative farms while they are still unconvinced of their advantages . . .

'To this end the Plenum decides:

'1. That fundamental changes be made in the system of quota purchases so that, while preserving the principle of progressive quotas, agricultural producers shall be left the greater quantity of their excess stocks to sell them freely to the state, cooperatives and consumers at free prices.

'2. That a real and fair correlation be established between the price of cereals and the price of other agricultural products, industrial goods and artisan services; that the prices of cereals be raised . . .

'5. That producers be guaranteed the freedom to sell their surpluses directly to consumers, after delivering their quota to the state . . .

'8. That the supply of the village with staple industrial products, both from local industry and from abroad, be improved . . .

'10 . . . . returning in certain places fields wrongly requisitioned from private farmers who received in exchange land of less value'. (Quoted by *Free Bulgaria*, 1st July, 1949).

The extent to which the Government overdid the exploitation of the peasantry was revealed even more clearly both by the evidence given during the Kostov Trial about the position of the agricultural population, and from the rise in the official prices for agricultural products after the June Plenum.

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The resistance of the peasantry has also compelled the government to slow down its drive for 'collectivisation'. On November 15th, 1949, *Otechestven Front* said that eighty-six government commissions had been set up to remedy mistakes in connection with the collective farms. They had to inquire into the activities of 1,264 co-operative farms (two-thirds of all the co-operative farms in the country) and examine 61,854 complaints of illegal requisition of land from peasants who had not joined the co-operatives. In 35,311 cases the land had been restored to its previous owners and those responsible for the mistakes punished.

The Bulgarian government is, it seems, compelled to go gently with the collectivisation drive, but it nevertheless does not renounce its aim. While on January 1st, 1950 there were 1,600 co-operative farms with 156,500 families and 1,377,050 acres, on October 1st, the number of co-operative farms reached 2,249, with 474,800 families and 4,707,700 acres. Thus 43.4 per cent of the agricultural population is in co-operative farms. (Vulko Chervenkov's Report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, October 7th and 8th, 1950).

Bulgaria is not the only country to experience peasant resistence to government policy. There is a food shortage in Czechoslovakia. The Russians are not responsible for this, as they buy scarcely any agricultural products from Czechoslovakia. Nor does Czechoslovakia export much food to other countries. There was a drought, it is true, but that was two years ago, and even at that time the number of livestock compared with pre-war was better than in any of the other satellites. Moreover the population was much below its pre-war number owing to the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans. The reason for the shortage must therefore be ascribed, at least partly, to the resistance of the peasants to delivering their products to the Government. The peasant resistance also expresses itself in the slowness of the progress of collectivisation. The Minister of Agriculture, Julius Duriš, said at the 9th Congress of the Communist Party, that in only 208 villages out of 13,000 were farm co-operatives operating (*Lidové Noviny*, 28th May, 1949). There had been many cases of almost open revolt at village meetings convened by the Communist Party to launch

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423 cooperatives, while other meetings had been boycotted by the
474 peasants. The General Secretary of the Party, Rudolf Slansky,
668 went as far as to say: 'The Party has failed to organise an explanatory campaign within its own rank and file, with the result that some Party members, not having been made to understand the significance of the co-operatives and not having been persuaded of their usefulness, have begun to waver and to fall under reactionary influences.'

Poland has had its troubles too. The Government was obliged to supply the wheat growers with far more industrial products than it had planned to do, and at lower prices than were prevailing on the free market. (*Glos Ludu*, May 4th, 1948). Other manifestations of peasant resistance disturbed the countryside. According to *The Times* of 25 January, 1949: 'During the last few weeks of 1948 at least 20 cases were published in the Government-controlled newspapers of Communist organizers killed while on duty in country districts. Most people think the figure much higher'. The Government in alarm retreated, and instead of carrying out its ambitious plan of organising 7,400 co-operative farms in 1949, reduced its target to a mere 200. (*The World Today*, August, 1949). The peasant resistance, although strong enough to slow down the collectivisation drive, did not divert the Communist leaders from their aim. On April 1st, 1949, there were 40 producer co-operatives in Poland; by October 1st, 145; by February 1st, 1950, 332, and by March 5th, 590. Of these 590 co-operative farms, 345 have been founded on a statute similar to that of the Russian kolkhozes, 192 are of what is called the second lowest type: 30-40 per cent of their net income is distributed as rent for land and implements pooled in the co-operatives and 60-70 per cent as wages for labour. 53 were of the lowest type: common cultivation of privately-owned land. (Roman Zambrowski, Secretary of the Central Committee of the P.P.R., in *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* March 10th, 1950). We may assume that the tempo of 'collectivisation' will be accelerated after the first experiments have been completed. An important step in hastening the 'collectivisation' was the decree that put the zloty at par with the Russian rouble: every peasant had until 13th November, 1950 to give up 100 old zloty for one new one, while as regards workers'

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wages and prices three new zloty were changed for 100 old zloty. With their meagre savings swept away, the peasants' resistance to collectivisation will be weakened.

Rumania has also experienced great peasant resistance to 'collectivisation'. In June, 1949, the government had to take strong measures against a partisan movement in the countryside, strongest in the Banat region. The government called the resisting peasants 'kulak hooligans', but a mere glance at its extortionate demands from the peasants belies this accusation. Every farm, down to the very smallest, must deliver large amounts of grain for low prices. For example, a peasant who has a farm of only 3 hectares must deliver 22 per cent of the yield for less than 20 per cent of the free market price. (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 7th April, 1949). No wonder the peasants rebel. The 'collectivisation' of Rumanian agriculture is still at its beginning: in September, 1949, the number of co-operative farms was only 55.

In Hungary the government was very careful in approaching the problem of 'collectivisation' and for a long time denied any intention of proceeding with it. Thus, for instance, in a speech before a peasant meeting in Debreczen on June 29th, 1947, Premier Lájos Dinnyes said: ' . . . . if the Government had any intention of creating kolkhozy it would not have carried out the land reform. What is good in one country is no use in another. A Hungarian Government which aimed to give up the principle of private property would be digging its own grave and the nation's. We aim to fortify the new peasantry'. (*The Times*, 30th June, 1947). After a certain amount of manoeuvring, nevertheless, the Hungarian Government did proceed to 'collectivise' agriculture, but it did so carefully and slowly. Up to November 1st, 1949, co-operative farms made up only 3.5 per cent of all the arable land of the country, and state farms another 3.5 per cent. Since then it has advanced considerably. In May, 1950, co-operative and state farms made up 17.8 per cent of all the land under cultivation.

In general it can be said that the process of 'collectivisation' is full of contradictions. Its aim is to secure food supplies and agricultural raw materials for the towns and for export, in order to facilitate industrialisation, as well as to get the necessary supply of labour power for industry and public work.

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CHAPTER III

YUGOSLAVIA— THE EXCEPTIONAL CASE

★

UNLIKE THE Communist Parties in the rest of Eastern Europe, the Yugoslav Communist Party took power not through the agency of the Russian army of occupation, but through the support of the masses who had rallied round it during the years of struggle against the German and Italian invaders and their collaborators.

The invasion of Yugoslavia by the Axis armies led to the complete collapse of the old state structure. Croatia and Bosnia split off and formed an 'independent' Croat state headed by Ante Pavelić; Slovenia was absorbed into the German Reich; Dalmatia was occupied by the Italians; south-eastern Serbia and eastern Macedonia were annexed by Bulgaria; Baranya, Bačka and Medjumurje were taken over by Hungary; and the province of Banat and Serbia proper were ruled by a quisling government under General Milan Nedić.

It was obvious that there had not been much love lost between the non-Serbs of Yugoslavia and the old chauvinistic Serbian rulers. The fascist elements among the non-Serbs used this hostility to divert the hatred felt for the Belgrade administration into a general national hatred of the Serbs, and one of the most sordid incidents in Yugoslav history ensued. The Ustashe—the Croat fascists—began a pogrom on a huge scale against the Serbs, during which 810 thousand Serbs, men, women and children, were callously murdered and whole villages razed to the ground. Moslem fascists in Bosnia also took part in the carnage. Some villages saved themselves from annihilation at the hands of the Croats by renouncing the Greek Orthodox Church and embracing Catholicism. The Catholic hierarchy of Croatia and Bosnia undertook an

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563 energetic crusade against Serb 'infidels.' Serb fascists retaliated
668 by murdering Croats and Moslems *en masse* in Bosnia, Herze-
661 govina, Dalmatia and elsewhere. While engaged in this communal slaughter, the quislings of each nation—Croats, Slovenes, Moslems and Serbs—collaborated with Berlin or Rome or with both.

642 Unlike them General Draža Mihailović, the military com-
668 mander of King Peter and his government in exile, stood for a united Yugoslavia including all the nations, but united under the rule of Serbia. His Chetniks were ready to take an active part in the massacre of Croats and Moslems, and Mihailović himself called upon the Allies to bomb Zagreb, the Croat capital, in revenge for their treachery. He even circulated propaganda maps of a future Yugoslavia in which Croatia was reduced to a small strip of land. To the Croatian, Montenegrin, Slovenian and also Serbian peasants and workers the old centralised administration symbolised by Mihailović represented the tax-collector, the gendarme and the corrupt local official. Mihailović's policy condemned him to increasing isolation and so to impotency, and finally to collaboration with the Germans and Italians against Tito's Partisans.

668 The only Party which fought for the unity of Yugoslavia on
186 the basis of the equality of all its component nations was the
563 Communist Party. The refugees from the pogroms constituted the first Partisan units, and the communal conflicts faced Tito's movement squarely with the problem whose solution proved to be decisive for its successes in the struggle for the liberation of the country from Axis occupation.

By a policy of national equality and of opposition to all communal conflicts, whether led by Ustashe and Moslem pogromists or Nedić and the Chetnik 'avengers', the Communist Party of Yugoslavia succeeded in welding the different peoples together. As Lieutenant-General Svetozar Vukmanović (better known as 'Tempo') said in his speech on the occasion of the celebration of 'Yugoslav Army Day' on 22nd December, 1947: 'The fighting of the Serbian and Montenegrin proletarian and shock brigades in Bosnia and Croatia; the fighting of Bosnian, Croatian and Montenegrin units in Serbia; the fighting of Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian, Macedonian, Montenegrin and Slovene units on the Srem front and beyond, for

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the ultimate liberation of Croatia, Bosnia, Slovenia, etc.—all this was an enormous contribution of the Yugoslav Army in the struggle for the establishment of unity among the peoples of Yugoslavia.' The unity of the peoples and their equality was symbolised in the fact that a Croat (Tito) led the revolt in Serbia, a Serbian Jew (Moše Pijade) led the rising in Montenegro, and a Montenegrin (Vukmanović) led the partisans in Macedonia.

This policy explains the phenomenon that military units of Italians, Hungarians and even German partisans fought in Tito's army. A large number of Italian soldiers joined the Partisans after the fall of Mussolini and formed the Garibaldi Volunteer units which were large enough to consist of a number of divisions. In the Slovene littoral, where Slovenes and Italians live side by side, Italian and Slovene Partisans formed common units, and Italians took an active and equal part in the work of the People's Committees, the embryonic administration of the new state. In spite of the cruelty displayed by the Hungarian occupation armies in the zone which they annexed, a cruelty greater even than that of the German armies, Tito succeeded in recruiting a battalion of Hungarian volunteers, the Petöfi Sandor battalion. There was also a Czech battalion in the Partisan Army. In July, 1943, a campaign was launched to enlist members of the German minority living in Yugoslavia in the Partisan army and this campaign met with some success, a Volksdeutsche battalion being organized to fight with the Partisans.

The social programme of Tito's Partisans was conservative. The Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation (A.V.N.O.J.) —the Partisans' parliament—at its first meeting in Bihać on 26th November, 1942, proclaimed a programme, two of whose points were:

'The inviolability of private property and the providing of every possibility for individual initiative in industry, trade and agriculture.

'No radical changes whatsoever in the social life and activities of the people except for the replacement of reactionary village authorities and gendarmes who may have gone over to the service of the invaders by popularly elected representatives truly democratic and popular in character. All the most

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668 185 important questions of social life and State organisation will be settled by the people themselves through representatives who will be properly elected by the people after the end of the war.'

These aims were constantly reiterated by the Partisan press and radio during the remaining three years of the war.

To illustrate the conservative character of the Partisans' social programme, it is only necessary to quote the oath taken by the new Croat volunteers: 'I swear by God Almighty and by all I hold dear that on my word of honour I shall always be true to the traditions of my ancestors. I will always fulfil trust towards the Croat people and will defend with my blood my national home from the German, Italian and Hungarian oppressors, and the traitors of my people. So help me God'. (Radio Free Yugoslavia, 13th June, 1943).

To reinforce this appeal to tradition a confessor or chaplain (vjerski referent) was attached to all the large military units.

668 This policy met with opposition from some members of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. An uprising in July, 1941, in Montenegro raised the banner of 'Soviet Montenegro', and in Herzegovina, deviations from the Party line by the Party organisation called forth harsh criticism from Aleksandar Ranković, one of the foremost leaders of the Party and today Minister of the Interior. (*Proleter*, December, 1942). In spite of some leftist deviations, however, the Bihać programme was consistently implemented until the liberation of all Yugoslavia.

668 471 Until the end of 1944, no social changes or changes in property ownership were introduced. On 14th February, 1945, Vice-Premier Kardelj insisted in a broadcast that in her economic structure Yugoslavia had not abandoned and would not abandon the general framework of capitalism.

The Bihać programme could be adhered to with comparative ease because the areas in the hands of the Partisans were those to which social conservatism was most acceptable. Both the most industrialised parts of Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Northern Croatia, came into the Partisans' hands only at the end of 1944 or beginning of 1945. The area in which there was a considerable number of rich peasants and German settlers, whose land would have been suitable for redistribution among the poorer peasantry, was also in the North. Thus until the end of 1944 or beginning of 1945 there were not many capitalists

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or rich peasants under their control and therefore no obvious targets for social discontent.

After that the industrial bourgeoisie was expropriated, without a formal renunciation of the Bihać programme, by the legal confiscation of the property of traitors. It was not until 5th December, 1946, that a nationalisation law was passed and this simply registered what was already an accomplished fact.

Because the Partisans operated far from the industrial centres, they consisted almost entirely of peasants. Although the workers of Yugoslavia supported the Communist Party almost to a man, they played a very small part in the movement. In the words of Bogdan Raditsa, a former press service director of the Tito government: ' . . . the working class was far from being a vital factor in the resistance, as the Communists allege in their propaganda. For the workers remained in the big-city factories or were sent into Hitler's labor camps'. (*New Republic*, September 16th, 1946). The peasant character of the Partisan movement explains its original plebeian and democratic character. It also explains why the Communist Party of Yugoslavia could easily impose its conservative programme upon it during 1941-44 and why the Partisan Army was easily transformed into a stratified army, a development common to many peasant guerillas, for instance, the Spanish guerillas fighting Napoleon.

In the beginning there was real democracy in the army. There were no ranks and no medals and after each operation meetings were held at which each partisan had the opportunity of making a public criticism of any aspect of the operation. For two years during the first four Offensives which put the Partisans to their severest test, this procedure was followed. But on May Day, 1943, the ranks of officers and N.C.O.'s were introduced, and in the next four months about 5,000 officers and 11 generals were created; Tito was raised to the rank of Marshal in November, 1943. In the state administration, the principle of electing People's Committees was rigorously adhered to in the countryside until the Partisans advanced from the mountainous and backward areas to the large towns, when they were no longer elected but *appointed*. When, as sometimes happened, elections were held, they were only a formality, as there was only one list of candidates. The

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The generals, colonels and other officers of the[1] army became the backbone of the new state administration and monopolised all political power. It was this new bureaucratic caste which carried out the nationalisation of industry, transferring all the industrial wealth of the country into its own hands.

Thus the Partisan movement passed from being a plebeian democracy with a progressive policy on the national question and a conservative social programme, to bureaucratic state capitalism.

[1] [Partisan army of Yugoslavia -- Analyst]

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668 The war was a great test of strength, moral and physical, for the P.P.S. The Party was mainly responsible for the decision to defend encircled Warsaw in September, 1939. The 'Colonels' recognised this and their spokesman said: 'The workers' defence smacks of socialist revolution'. Having had long experience in illegal work since the time of Tsarism, the P.P.S. quickly accommodated itself to the new conditions of struggle under the German heel. For conspiratorial purposes, the Party adopted the name 'The Movement of the Working Masses of Poland', and was generally called the W.R.N. from the initial letters of its slogan: 'Freedom (Wolność) Equality (Równość) Independence (Niepodległość).' The following quotation describes the activity of the W.R.N. under the German occupation: ' . . . a large secret organisational network of the W.R.N. comprised, already at the end of 1940, over 2,000 units. The underground Socialist Press and pamphlets reached, in the course of the war, the amazing figure of 2 million copies. A Socialist military organisation was created under the name of O.W.P.P.S. (Socialist Insurgent Military Detachments), which was included, as a separate and distinct organisation, in the national scheme of the Underground Home Army (A.K.). There was, besides, a Socialist Militia, organised both on a territorial and on a factory basis. All these organisations played an outstanding role, *inter alia* in the Warsaw Uprising of 1944.' (A. Ciolkosz, *The Expropriation of a Socialist Party*, New York, September-October, 1946, p.3). The price paid by the P.P.S. for this resistance to the German occupation was high. 'Notwithstanding the strict observance of all conspiratorial rules—in which the P.P.S., owing to her old revolutionary tradition excelled anyone else—heavy losses could not be avoided. Three members of the Central Executive Committee of the Party (Niedziałkowski, Czapiński, Topinek) and 28 other members of the Supreme Council of the Party, perished at the hands of the invaders. Altogether about 700 prominent leaders of the Party met their death under the occupation. From these figures the losses amongst the rank and file can be imagined.' (Ibid. p. 4).

661 When the Soviet Army entered Poland in 1944, one of the main objectives of the Russians was to destroy the P.P.S. and, to achieve this, they used the same technique as they used

4 [The Socialist Party -- Analyst]

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	Germans (%)	Czechs and Slovaks (%)
Independent	21.89	25.81
Tenants	0.40	0.28
Officials and clerks ..	16.60	18.24
Workers	61.11	55.67

467 In 1930 there were 476 thousand Sudeten Germans organised in trade unions. The Executive Committee of the Sudeten German Social Democratic Party stated: 'In their worst plight, on the eve of the Munich decision, our Trade Unions could still compare their strength with those of Switzerland, a country with four million inhabitants and with a functioning democracy.' (Introduction to W. Jaksch, *Sudeten Labour and the Sudeten Problem*, London, 1945).

665 The Sudeten Germans had a long socialist tradition, for Sudetenland was one of the first and strongest socialist centres in the Austro-Hungarian empire. It produced a number of the most prominent leaders of the Socialist International, among them Karl Kautsky, Viktor Adler, Otto Bauer and Karl Renner. As early as 1907, in the general elections, the Social Democratic Party polled 39.4 per cent of the votes in German Bohemia. In the general elections of 1911, it polled more than 40 per cent. In the elections of 1920 it polled 44 per cent of the Sudeten votes. Together with the Communist Party,* for more than a decade it had about half the votes in Sudetenland, which is a much higher proportion than the Social Democrats and Communists could claim among the Czechs, let alone among the Slovaks.

563 464 The world economic crisis which began in 1929 changed the situation. The industry of Sudetenland, depending as it did mainly on exports, was affected much more severely by the crisis than industry in the rest of the country. The bourgeois government of Czechoslovakia discriminated against German workers when giving employment, and this aggravated an already grave situation. The result was that 'unemployment in the Sudeten districts was at least twice as high as in the Czech interior.' (Jaksch, ibid. p. 17).

464 668 The great suffering caused by unemployment in Sudetenland and the existence of full employment just over the border

*An exact calculation of the strength of the Communist Party among the Sudetens is impossible, as the Party was not divided into different national groups.

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in Nazi Germany (even though this was the result of war preparation) brought the Sudeten Germans to flock to the banner of Henlein, the leader of the Sudeten Nazis. In the elections of 19th May, 1935, he polled 1,249,530 votes, that is, 62–3 per cent of the total, while the Social Democratic Party polled 299,942 votes (as against 506,761 in 1929), that is, about 15 per cent of the total. The Communist Party vote is estimated at about 120,000, or about 6 per cent of the total (Wiskemann, op. cit. p. 206).

At that time the Communist Party leaders had not yet adopted the idea that the Sudeten Germans were inherent Nazis, and explained the victory of Henlein as the result of the social and national circumstances in which they were placed. *Imprecor* of 1st June, 1935, wrote: 'In a manifesto of the Central Committee the Party states the reasons for the election victory of the Henlein faction. The reason for this victory is the policy of the Czech bourgeoisie which has led to terrible misery and poverty and to the national oppression in the German districts . . . The Henlein fascists can be beaten only by a policy which gives the working masses of the German districts work and bread and liberates them from the yoke of national oppression.'

What was the fate of the Sudeten Germans who opposed Henlein to the end? 400,000 voted against him, and these with their families made up 700–800 thousand people. When the Munich Agreement which gave Sudetenland to Germany was signed, the most active Sudeten anti-Nazis were compelled to flee from Sudetenland to the interior of Czechoslovakia. But more than 20,000 of them were handed over to the Gestapo by the Czechoslovak Government of the time, which collaborated with Hitler, and an additional 10,000 had to return to Nazi-controlled territory because they were refused asylum. Only 4,000 Sudetens were admitted to other countries. Altogether some 40,000 Sudetens were interned in Nazi concentration camps, and about 20,000 died there. This figure bears honourable comparison with the number of victims in other countries which came under the Nazi yoke.

In 1940, Fierlinger, the Social Democratic 'fellow-traveller', who was later to head the Government which expelled the Germans from Czechoslovakia, said: 'Henlein in his struggle

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The direction of people's minds along the groove required by Moscow begins at school. Pupils in Ukraine are made to pay tribute to Kutuzov, known as the hangman of the Ukrainians. Chmelnitzki, who massacred the Jews and betrayed the Ukrainian peasants into Russian serfdom must be acclaimed a national hero. Pupils in Azerbaidjan must be taught that the Russian occupation of their country in 1806 was not symbolic of the superiority of Russian arms alone, but shows the long attachment of Azerbaidjan to Russian culture. It is often very difficult for the non-Russian scholars to explain their history in the way required, and they are frequently accused of nationalism. In the summer of 1944, the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. severely criticized the cultural work of the Tartar Republic, its main defalcation being nationalist falsifications in the teaching of its national history. The Tartars were instructed to emphasize the elements in their history which united them with Russia (*Propagandist*, 15th June, 1944). The journal *Kultura i Zhizn* of 30th November, 1945, is devoted mainly to criticisms of 'nationalist deviations' in the teaching of history. The institutes of history in the Ukrainian, Tartar, Bashkir, Armenian, Georgian, Latvian and White Russian Republics all come in for their measure of stern criticism.

The war proved a great test for Stalin's national policy. The fact that the soldiers of the U.S.S.R. fought with great courage proves nothing by itself. Russia's greatest military victories in the eighteenth century were won by Suvorov in Catherine the Great's reign, the worst period of serfdom. The serfs who were so cruelly exploited showed immense heroism and self-sacrifice in the army. In the Second World War the German and Japanese soldiers doggedly persisted in their struggle even when all hope of military victory was lost, but this fact does not prove that there were harmonious social relations within these countries.

It is extremely difficult to discover the whole truth about the number of quislings in Russia. The case of General Vlassov is well known. He received the highest orders of the Red Army at the beginning of the war, but on being taken prisoner by the Germans, organised an army of between 100,000 and 1,000,000 prisoners of war from the U.S.S.R. to fight by the side of the Germans. This by itself, however, indicated very little. Hitler,

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for instance, was more successful in finding quislings in France than in Russia, but much less successful in Poland, where he could not get one general or military unit to fight on his side. Nevertheless, Vlassov's defaulting was disquieting to the Russian authorities, and they took care never to mention it in the press or over the radio.

At the end of the war, repeated attacks in the press on fascist influence in the areas of occupation—Ukraine, White Russia, Crimea and the Caucasus—serve as clear testimony to the apathy or even enmity of the populations to the Russian authorities. For instance, *Bolshevik* of 17th August, 1944, stated: '. . . the population of White Russia was for three years deprived of real Soviet information, and was under the influence of lying fascist propaganda. This applied also to other now freed areas. The Soviet people remained true to their Fatherland. (Examples follow—Y.G.) . . . This does not give us the right to quiescence. The treacherous enemy, with his lying propaganda, with his bloody terror, hitherto unparalleled in history, demoralised more than a few people, brought more than a little confusion in their consciousness. He strengthens his agency which conducts skilled undermining work . . .' In another issue of *Bolshevik* there occurs this statement: 'The existence and the vitality of vestiges of capitalism in the mind of people in our country is explained not only by the fact that people's minds are lagging behind economic conditions, but also by the influence of an alien ideology . . . The German fascist occupants endeavoured to implant the ideology of private property and of nationalism . . . (The enemy) did his utmost to demoralise them, to poison their consciousness and to sap their belief in the rightness of our great cause.' (Quoted by *The Economist*, 16th March, 1946).

The explanation is not convincing. The Nazi reign of terror would not sow doubts and breed hatred against the Russian regime, but on the contrary, would put it in a much better light in the eyes of the oppressed. This quotation reveals that, in spite of the German terror and oppression, anti-Russian 'nationalist deviations' occurred. To one who knows how to read the Communist Party press, such an admission, repeated in numerous articles, is a sure sign that an important fact is being touched on.

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rivalries among the nationalities frequently occupied as much energy as the struggle against the dynastic governments.

The development of nationalism and liberation in Eastern Europe was the product of many influences. Within the larger framework of the enlightenment, the peoples of this region were stimulated by the philosophy of nationalism developed by Herder and his school and by the ideas of the French Revolution disseminated through cultural channels and by Napoleon's armies. The Poles, Czechs, and Magyars were most strongly influenced by this new spirit at first, and until the middle of the nineteenth century liberalism took precedence over nationalism. In this period a Czartoryski, a Palacky, and a Széchenyi worked for reforms within the political framework established in 1815, and their policies produced significant results. It was only after the defeat of liberalism in the abortive revolutions of 1848 that nationalism came to predominate, and this nationalism was rapidly hardened by the opposition that it encountered. By the end of the century only the Magyars had achieved the substance of their national aims, and this at the expense of becoming among the most rigorous oppressors of their own non-Magyar minorities. The peoples of Southeastern Europe achieved independence only to a limited degree before the First World War, while the Poles and Czechs remained under firm imperial rule. The approximate distribution of these nationalities at the turn of the century is illustrated by the table on page 8.

Of all the oppressed peoples of Eastern Europe, the Poles were the most numerous and their situation in 1815 the most acute. Possessors of a proud tradition of government dating back to the later middle ages, and at one time the third in area and fourth in population among the European powers, they had suffered domestic disintegration and territorial partition in the eighteenth century. In the peace settlement of 1815 the largest segment of Poland was in-

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186 Much more was heard about Panslavism between 1848
668 and 1914, but during this period it was used primarily as a
648 weapon of Russian expansionism. The Slavic movement evolved in Russia early in the century under the name of Slavophilism and, with the founding of a Slavic committee in Moscow in 1857, it entered a Panslav phase. In 1867 non-Russian Slavs were summoned to a congress in Moscow in connection with a Slav ethnographic exhibition, and at this meeting it was not difficult to discern the expansionist tendencies of Russian Panslavism. During the Russian-Turkish war of 1876-78, this movement developed into an outburst of emotional imperialism, and much was said of bringing all Slavs together under Russian rule. European power politics prevented an undue extension of Russian influence in 1878, but Panslavism came to serve Russian policy and was directed increasingly against the Habsburg empire. This trend was particularly evident at the third Panslav Congress held in Prague in 1908. Although the Russian constitutional reforms of 1905-06 made a favorable impression on non-Russian Slavs and brought about some real concessions to the Polish minority, Russian foreign policy never gave up the idea of pushing the Russian frontier to the West. Had the Tsarist regime survived the First World War it would certainly have demanded that large parts of Eastern Europe be annexed or brought into a satellite relationship, and a liberal Russian government might also have favored the Westward expansion of Russian influence.

631 The multinational empire of the Habsburgs offered the
642 most challenging problem to the federalists, and the proposals for its constitutional reorganization were varied and ingenious, Of the many ideas arising out of the revolution of 1848, the most comprehensive was the constitution drafted by the freely elected Austrian assembly. After this assembly

829 History clearly proves the accuracy of this analysis. In the second half of the nineteenth century, a "liberal" climate prevailed in Europe. At that time liberalism penetrated even into Tsarist Russia. The belief that Russia has an inherent tendency toward despotism and slavery leads one to forget that liberal ideas found excellent propagandists and defenders there; to mention but a few: Radishchev, Pestel, Herzen, Soloviev, Milyukov, Chernov, and the Decembrists. In the nineteenth century, liberal tendencies were growing in strength and influence in Eastern Europe and contributed considerably to the struggle for national liberation. The victory of the liberal Western democracies in 1918 led to the liberal democratization of almost all Eastern Europe.

III

668 642 The obstacles faced by liberalism in Eastern Europe included both the threat of Communist, and later of fascist and Nazi, interference and the efforts of domestic authoritarian groups that saw in dictatorship the answer to the problems of this region. In spite of these highly unfavorable circumstances, democratic liberalism maintained itself even when dictatorial governments were formed. A courageous opposition fought these regimes without fearing the persecution to which it was exposed. It is easy to prove that Pilsudski and, later, Beck in Poland, Horthy in Hungary, Carol in Rumania, Boris in Bulgaria, Alexander and Paul in Yugoslavia, and Dolfuss and Schuschnigg in Austria, were opposed by democratic forces stronger than, or at least as strong as, the forces which Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin were meeting in their respective countries. In Germany and Russia and, to a large extent, in Italy, the dictatorial regimes were totalitarian and therefore opposition was almost impossible. But the fact that in Eastern Europe only limited dictatorships were established shows that antiliberal, antidemocratic trends were hampered by the opposition of democratic forces. In

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this great struggle, many liberals, especially in Yugoslavia, 668
Rumania, and Austria, were lured into the services of dic- 642
tatorial regimes, and thus doomed themselves to failure.

It would be unjust to discount the actions of either Constantin Bratianu or Titulescu because of the opportunist Tatarescu who placed himself at the disposal of King Carol, or to forget the courageous Ion Duca who, for his uncompromising liberal principles, was assassinated in 1933 by the fascist terrorists of the Iron Guard. In Yugoslavia, there were a number of radicals and democrats enlisted in the service of the royal dictatorship. They thus distinctly deviated from the radical democratic tradition which, especially before the First World War, was represented by Nikola Pašić, famous for his revolutionary struggle against the dictatorial desires of the Obrenović rulers. Pašić was influenced not only by Western liberalism, in which the democratic Serbian King Peter I was educated, but by the revolutionism of the Russian Populists. The influence of the Russian revolutionaries was also strong in Bulgaria, especially in her agrarian movement. For some of those who associated with King Alexander's dictatorship, Foreign Minister Marinković for instance, there may have been extenuating circumstances, for those men were led by fear of the decomposition of Yugoslavia.

Nevertheless, as in Rumania, some earnest liberals in Yugoslavia courageously opposed the royal dictatorship. Because of Stoyadinović, who put a shame on the liberal tradition of the Radical Party, one must not forget Aca Stanojević, a friend of Pašić, or Miša Trifunović who did not fear imprisonment and refused any collaboration with the dictatorship. In the opposition remained also Slobodan Jovanović, an influential professor of Belgrade University, who in the Second World War became the Premier of the Yugoslavian government in London. Against the royal dictatorship were also leaders of the Democratic Party: Ljuba

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668 642 Davidović and Božidar Vlajić among the Serbians, Večeslav Vilder, a disciple of Masaryk, among the Croatians, and Milan Grol among the Slovenes. The famous Svetozar Pribičević distinguished himself for his courageous opposition to the Alexander dictatorship; he may be counted justly among the founders of Yugoslavia. He also was under Masaryk's influence, and it was through Masaryk's personal intervention with King Alexander that the interned Pribičević was allowed to go into exile. Pribičević gave an example to many others by repudiating his devotion to the Karadjordjević dynasty and becoming a radical republican. The royal dictatorship was opposed also by the Croatian Peasant Party, headed by Vladko Maček, and by the Serbian Agrarian Party, headed by Dragoljub Jovanović. The democratic opposition to the royal dictatorship has been cited in order to point out that when Titoist communism calls itself an "organic" result of the Yugoslav internal development, it does not make any allowance for the strong liberal tradition of Yugoslavia. In Hungary, C. Rassay was the most distinguished defender of liberalism.

The Bulgarian liberals played a prominent role in their country before the First World War but, in compromising with King Ferdinand, they were partly responsible for the unfortunate policies that led to the defeat of 1918. In the period between the two wars they were pushed into the background by nationalists and reactionaries such as Tsankov. Nevertheless, some Bulgarian liberals tried to preserve their own tradition. In 1924 Genadiev paid for his courageous devotion to liberal ideas with his life. Through the efforts of Malinov and Mušanov, the democratic regime was resumed at the beginning of the 'thirties, but the military *coup d'état* in 1934 installed a "progressive dictatorship." King Boris took advantage of this in order to establish his own dictatorship. The opposition of the liberals to this dictatorship was

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weak in comparison with that of the Agrarian Party which still followed Stambolisky's tradition. 668 642

The Agrarian and the Socialist parties and some Catholics, as well as the liberals, carried on the struggle against dictatorship in Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland, and Hungary. They fought for real democracy in the sense of the best liberal tradition. In Austria the Social Democrats were the main force opposing clerical fascism. It is interesting that in Hungary the conservative aristocrats opposed fascist trends. Szálasi, who led the important Arrow-Cross movement, was the most conspicuous of these men. Count Bethlen and Count Teleki also opposed the Nazi pressure, and the latter's efforts were climaxed by his symbolic suicide in 1941.

The opposition to dictatorship and to fascism or Nazism was motivated differently in the individual Eastern European countries and was carried on by different political parties. Notwithstanding these differences, the original inspiration to opposition lay in two main ideas: a longing for freedom and a patriotic devotion to national independence. Pure democratic liberalism is the expression of these two ideas, both of which prove convincingly that the love of freedom was deeply rooted in these countries. Internal antiliberal forces alone would not have been able to crush democratic aspirations. Whenever the elections were more liberal than usual, for instance, in Rumania in 1928 or in Bulgaria in 1931, the democratic parties won. In Poland, Pilsudski's followers, who represented only a small minority of the nation, were well aware that the only means by which they could maintain their regime was political terror. In spite of the pressure of the reactionaries and the influence of fascists and Nazis, the remnants of liberalism in Hungary survived until nearly the end of the Second World War. In view of these facts, it is clear that the liberal democratic forces could have mastered internal difficulties successfully 186 668 829

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had they not been broken or dangerously weakened by the foreign forces of fascism and Communism.

Czechoslovakia bears witness to this thesis. In Czechoslovakia, as in the other countries, there existed antiliberal, reactionary, nationalist, and fascist trends which attracted certain of the bourgeoisie and rich farmers. These forces were held in check by the democratic thought and genuine patriotism of a great majority of the nation, including the so-called middle classes and the intelligentsia. Nearly everybody followed the principles of the great democrat, Masaryk. Conditions were more favorable to democratic liberalism in Czechoslovakia than in the other Eastern European countries, because this nation was highly industrialized, even in agriculture, because her social structure was happily balanced between industry, agriculture, and bureaucracy, or intelligentsia, and because the cultural level of her people was high. The middle classes, strong in numbers and in social value, and the progressive farmers, who owned middle-sized farms, were reliable support for the liberal democratic regime. The Social Democratic Party, headed by Hampl, Bechyně, Meissner, and Dérer, was influenced spiritually far more by Masaryk than by Marx. The Agrarian Party had liberal-minded leaders among whom Antonín Švehla and Milan Hodža proved to have statesmen's abilities. The Catholic Party, under the wise leadership of the great patriot Jan Šrámek, was progressive in social matters. In Slovakia the process of democratization met with greater difficulties. Slovakia, because of its agrarian structure, resembled the other Eastern European countries more than it did the industrialized Bohemia. However, the transformation of Slovakia into a democratically functioning part of Czechoslovakia proves that other Eastern European countries could have developed in a similar way had democracy been given enough time to exercise its influence upon them.

It is certainly to the credit of Czechoslovakia that she

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and supplied him with goods. Frequently he had a strong and pernicious hold on the peasant.

Therefore, the cooperative movement began with the foundation of credit societies which formed a very large proportion of all cooperatives. Besides these, there were cooperative societies which supplied agricultural needs such as tools and seeds, traded agricultural products, and processed all sorts of produce. In Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania the cooperative movements were state-controlled. In Czechoslovakia the movement was independent but favored by the state; in Poland, beginning with the economic depression of the 1930's it was state-supported and therefore dependent.

The cooperative problem was a difficult one. On the one hand, cooperation among economically weak peasants could not succeed unless there was some collaboration with, or help from, the central authorities. On the other hand, such a relationship between strong and weak tended to develop into state domination of the cooperative movement.

The administrators of the cooperatives sometimes abused their prerogatives. They would occasionally grant government loans, not in response to genuine needs or because of commercial considerations, but with a view to the substantial number of votes which one cooperative society could guarantee at election time. In some instances, cooperatives served only well-to-do peasants because some governments were opposed to the social revolutionary ideology of the smaller peasants. In Rumania the cooperative societies were forced to assume the function of the tax collector. In Hungary the cooperatives belonged to the peasants in appearance only. In reality, they were capitalist enterprises and were not in peasant hands.

Except in Czechoslovakia, agricultural cooperation did not play any decisive role in the economic life of the peasantry, nor was it able to alleviate the existing adverse

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he regarded the peasant as indispensable to the success of his revolution and to the consolidation of his dictatorship. This policy was reversed by Stalin after 1928 when forced collectivization of land in the form of pseudo-cooperatives (collective farms) was introduced in the Soviet Union.

Lenin's agricultural policy was adopted by all Eastern European Communist parties after the end of the Second World War. Being minorities in power, they knew that this was the only attitude they could take to the peasantry, the largest social group in this region. Therefore, they supported small agrarian property holders in the first stage of the development of their agricultural policy. There was only one difference between the Communist agricultural policies of Eastern Europe and Russia. Nationalization of land was not a part of the Eastern European policy, as it had not proved expedient in the Soviet Union and therefore was not contained in the agrarian policy of the Comintern for Eastern Europe in the inter-war period.

The Comintern had taken much interest in the Eastern European agrarian question. In 1923 a Red Peasants International was formed in Moscow as an effort to rally the peasantry to the Communist ideal and to combat the influence of the peasant parties united in the Green International in Prague. The Soviet move to collectivization within the U.S.S.R. in 1929 was not followed by any shift in the agrarian policy of the Comintern. Any mention of collective farming was frowned upon and the whole emphasis was upon attracting or neutralizing the middle peasant by assisting the individual and by supporting with new land reforms the peasant's struggle for more land. This policy was not changed when the Cominform took over the role of the Comintern after the Second World War.

"The land to those who till it personally," was the slogan of all Eastern European Communist parties, and land reforms were carried out in all countries. In Hungary, Albania,

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The liberation of the peasantry was a consequence of the demands of the new liberal movement and was one of the achievements of the liberal regimes which gained momentum on the Continent after the Napoleonic era. This European liberalism had been a result of the struggle of the bourgeoisie against the old political and economic order upheld previously by the aristocracy. It originated in the theory of natural rights, as interpreted by French political philosophers of the eighteenth century, and included in its doctrine the postulate of political, economic, and social freedom and equality for all individuals.

However, it would be wrong to assume that the formal liberation of the peasantry was an immediate result of its emulation of other classes of society, in particular, of the bourgeoisie. On the contrary, the struggle for the realization of peasant rights had still to be fought.

The ruling regimes imposed political restrictions that were usually based on the tax census system and barred large masses of the peasant population from their right to vote in parliamentary elections. In many of the countries, it was not until the end of the First World War that complete franchise was granted to the peasantry.

Economic freedom, as advocated and practiced by liberalism, soon began to undermine the foundations of the peasant economy. The peasantry, which under feudalism had paid most of its rents and other fees to the landlord in natural produce, was placed suddenly in the midst of a complicated money-economy in which the autarkic arrangements of the peasant familistic economy were no longer valid. Peasant land, which throughout centuries had changed little in price or in value, was suddenly submitted to wide fluctuations in value as a consequence of the rapid development of the communication system and the erection of industrial plants. The appearance of a money-economy created the necessity of establishing an appropriate credit system which heretofore had been lacking completely in the peasant orbit. The state,

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considered at all, were reviewed and evaluated only from the point of view of production with no attention paid to the human side of their problems. Moreover, the contempt of Marx for the peasantry is well known. He called them a "class of barbarians," and proclaimed his desire to save humanity from the "idiocy of rural life." 829

The reaction to scientific socialism and a simultaneous opposition to liberalism brought about the birth of Christian democracy which attempted to formulate a middle-road policy between the economic freedom of liberalism and the socialist doctrine of the total negation of the absolute truth, of private property, and of human dignity. Being primarily a reaction to the liberal-socialist dispute on capital-labor relations, this new doctrine was concerned very little, if at all, with the peasant problem which "remained the stepchild of public opinion and of the social policy."

The first attempt to use the contemporary social and economic ideas for the organization of the peasant masses was partly accountable for the appearance of Populism in Russia in the 1870's. More specifically, Populism was an endeavor to create an ideal agrarian peasant community by applying the theories of scientific socialism. This very fact converted the effort into a unique social and economic movement sharply in conflict with the orthodox Marxism. It became clear very soon to the promoters of Populism that the formulas conceived by Marx were inefficient in a rural society and that diversified methods must be sought if the needs and hopes of the peasants were to be satisfied. This new movement, although peasant, was of revolutionary character, not only demanding the land for the peasants but also advocating its collective ownership under a particular form of Russian organization known as the *mir*. It pointed out that the essence of the Populist program must be the institutions and desires inherent in the people and that it must not represent scientific formulas imported from abroad. 668 565

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829 Although Populism exerted some influence on the establishment of the Rumanian peasant movement, it had very little influence upon the other peasant movements in Eastern Europe. At the time when Populism was already an organized political force in Russia, the peasantry in Eastern Europe was still politically inactive. When the peasant mobilization began, more than two decades later, it was influenced little, if at all, by the Populist ideas.

668 565 423 The main reason for the relatively late organization of the peasantry in Eastern Europe was the presence of political and economic conditions essentially different from those prevailing in Tsarist Russia. Whereas regular political life was unknown in Russia, European liberalism favored the formation of political parties which would try to win the sympathies of the peasants by promising them the realization of their desires. Collective ownership of land was not a common institution in Eastern Europe. However, the prediction of Marx relating to the accumulation of capital and further expansion of large estates proved to be incorrect. On the contrary, many large land holdings, unable to accommodate themselves to modern capitalist management, commenced to disintegrate. The land was usually bought, in spite of heavy material sacrifices, by land-hungry neighboring peasants, and thus many new independent peasant holdings were created, which contributed considerably to the strengthening of the peasantry.

Hence, the establishment of a revolutionary peasant movement was checked by existing political conditions: the traditions of the Eastern European peasantry were opposed to collective forms of land ownership and to the socialist tenets of Populism. However, none of the existing political groups was fit to meet the increased desire of the peasantry for an organized action of their own, and, at the turn of the century, on an independent basis and in opposition to the contemporary political and social groups, peasant organization began.

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The common source of the peasant movements resided in the political, social, and economic evils of the liberal regimes, but immediate motives varied slightly in the different countries. In some countries, the emphasis on the necessity for peasant organization was a reaction to the adverse economic conditions to which the peasantry was exposed. In other countries, this move was a political and economic reaction to political and national oppression, economic exploitation, and the contempt of the ruling ethnical groups for the peasantry of subordinated nations. Finally, the Croatian peasants had special motives. Their peasant movement was organized chiefly to struggle for the social and political equality of the peasants against the dominating bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy. The latter, although it represented an insignificant minority in the nation, had monopolized Croatian political life.

The first to outline the philosophical principles of a peasant movement was Ante Radić in Croatia. Influenced by French Romantic philosophers, especially Michelet, Radić published, in 1896, his work, *Osnova*, in which he set forth his concept of the people (in peasant countries this meant the peasantry), and indicated their significance in the political and economic life of the nation.

The first coherent peasant organizations were those of the Bulgarians and the Czechs who both founded their first peasant political organizations in 1896. They were followed shortly by the Croatians in 1904, and by the Serbians and the Poles in 1905. The first steps for a peasant movement in Rumania were initiated in 1907, while in Hungary the appearance of a genuine peasant movement was retarded by political and socio-economic conditions until 1908. In the Baltic States, true political life started only with the independence gained after the First World War. Subsequently, powerful peasant political organizations were founded in Estonia and Latvia. In Albania the initiative for a peasant political or-

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ganization did not exist until the Second World War; the organization itself was established after the war by exiled political leaders.

In Slovenia, Slovakia, and Lithuania, on the other hand, truly peasant political organizations have never developed fully. In these Catholic countries the peasantry was influenced from the beginning by the Catholic political thought and subsequently organized on the principles of Christian democracy.

Although the immediate motives for peasant organization in different countries were varied, its demands were everywhere identical because of its common general source—its ideological basis. The programs made the following demands for the peasants: full political rights, proportional participation in public affairs, agrarian reform and distribution of the land to the peasants, social justice, and rights for the peasants in educational facilities equal to the rights of other classes in the state.

To understand better the peasant movements and their aims, three elements of their ideological and organizational structure must be discussed: first, their ideological basis; second, the dogmatic differences between these and other contemporary political and socio-economic trends; and third, the effective points of their practical programs.

The peasant ideology, or peasantism, is the outlook of the peasantry on the complex of political and socio-economic issues in which the peasants are interested and for whose solution they are fighting. The organizational forms of peasantism, established for the purposes of current political struggle, are the various peasant political parties. Unlike scientific socialism or Christian democracy, peasantism is not the artificial creation of an individual or group of individuals; it contains only those ideas which are inherent in the peasant soul and character. Consequently, the peasant leaders do not conceive the political soul of peasantism but merely interpret

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and articulate its principles. Hence, considerable differences must exist between peasantism and other contemporary movements.

Between peasantism and scientific socialism, there are irreconcilable differences, reflected in philosophical, economic, social, and political concepts. Philosophically, scientific socialism advocates economic determinism, dialectic materialism, and the materialistic interpretation of history. Consequently, it repudiates the existence of a superior being, rejects religion and spiritual values as detrimental to human development, and minimizes the significance of tradition. Peasantism, on the contrary, relies on the idealistic principles of philosophical reasoning, stresses the existence of God, points out the necessity for religious beliefs, and indicates the importance of spiritual values. It emphasizes as of equal importance the significance of tradition in human development and reaffirms its position in the peasant society.

Economically, scientific socialism demands the collectivization of the means of production, including land, and the introduction of a planned socialist economy. It evaluates individuals and collective groups exclusively on the basis of their role in socialist production and repudiates economic individualism in any form. Peasantism, on the contrary, defends firmly the principle of private ownership of the means of production, especially of the peasant land, and teaches that the right to dispose of the fruits of one's own labor is sacred and inviolable. It rejects the planned economy of socialism and favors private initiative and the system of free cooperation.

Socially, scientific socialism teaches the necessity of a permanent class struggle and considers as inevitable the revolutionary overthrow of the existing social and economic order by the proletariat. Peasantism, on the contrary, rejects the idea of class struggle and believes in the possibility of a peaceful coexistence of all classes of society. It also rejects

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the revolutionary methods advocated by scientific socialism, believing that the necessary changes in society can be achieved by peaceful means and evolutionary methods.

Politically, scientific socialism is totalitarian in its concept. It does not tolerate the existence of other political and social systems, nor is it willing to share power with other political groups. Peasantism, on the contrary, is genuinely democratic and ready to collaborate with other political and social forces provided they are democratically disposed and have their roots in the will of the people.

The differences between peasantism and other current ideologies, although existent, are less emphatic. Peasantism distinguishes itself from liberalism mainly in its economic ideas. While it agrees with liberalism on the concepts of political freedom and social equality, it rejects the ideas of the latter on uncontrolled economic liberties. Past experience has proved to the followers of peasantism that in peasant countries unrestricted economic liberties are detrimental to peasant farming and to national economies.

Ideological differences between peasantism and Christian democracy are more subtle. Both ideologies cherish the fundamental principles of human dignity and of individual freedom; both teach the existence of God, reject the materialistic interpretation of the world, and seek to establish a middle road between total economic freedom and complete submission of the individual to the community. Yet, there is an important structural element which has contributed essentially to a separate organization of the peasantry in Eastern Europe. Since 1891 when the papal encyclical, *Rerum Novarum*, was issued, and especially since 1931 with the appearance of the encyclical, *Quadragesimo Anno*, Christian democracy has been an eminently Catholic doctrine and, consequently, not best fitted to attract the peasantry which is made up of different religious denominations. Peasantism, on the contrary, while pointing out the necessity of religion,

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has no preference for any particular religious denomination and is for this reason better adapted to the peasantry.

Finally, peasantism rejects definitely the political and social concepts of modern totalitarianism. Totalitarian and undemocratic regimes in Eastern Europe during the interwar period were always upheld by military cliques, aristocratic and bureaucratic groups, or by the ruling dynasties whose aims were to keep the power at all costs and whose political methods and social views were diametrically opposed to the fundamental principles of peasantism.

Politically, peasantism advocates a system of parliamentarianism with two additional features: accentuation of local self-government and direct participation in the government of the greatest number of people. Economically, peasantism favors free cooperatives because it believes that cooperation preserves the principles of private property and permits the exercise of private initiative. The latter is favored when cooperative arrangements are not adequate to meet economic requirements.

III

Although the peasant movements and parties were initiated before the First World War, they achieved their full strength and political significance only after the war was over. There were three causes for this postwar rise of peasant political organizations: the formation of the national states, the universal franchise, and the agrarian reforms.

The formation of national states in Eastern Europe contributed enormously to the development of political life. While the people of this area had heretofore directed most of their political endeavors against the oppression of the ruling nations, in the new era they directed their efforts toward the solution of vital economic and social issues.

Universal franchise enabled the peasant population to

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Due to the prevalence of a liberalism linked with national- 186
ism, studies concentrated on history, which was generally 871
given a romantic interpretation. The study of geography was 814
heavily larded with political convictions and misinterpretations of ethnography. Although the universities of Czechoslovakia and Hungary were on a high academic level at a time when other universities were just becoming active, their students spent too much time in petty politics. Most of the 186 668
student organizations supported some political person or party and, as a consequence, were strongly influenced by demagogues. The Polish and Rumanian universities especially were exploited by politicians, and often even by the police, for political purposes. Frequent political meetings aroused a discontented idealism and produced only too often regrettable chauvinistic or antisemitic behavior.

Anti-Semitism became a common denominator with which 798
Hitler was able to unite the rising youth and the politicians of Eastern Europe. The responsibility for this state of affairs lay with the governments and the ruling groups.

Although the new boundaries had been drawn on the 563
principle of national self-determination, the mixture of nationalities in many areas, as well as historical and geographical factors, had resulted in the inclusion of important minorities within the new states. These minorities were fragments of peoples rather than whole nations as had been the case before the war and, since they were in many cases unwilling citizens of the new states, their presence constituted a grave problem. The eight million inhabitants of Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia that spoke Russian, Ukrainian (Ruthenian), and White Russian as their mother tongue, the almost six million German-speaking citizens of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Hungary, and the almost three million Hungarian-speaking inhabitants of neighboring Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia—these represented the most important, but by no means all, the minority

area. It is unjust to accuse the Eastern European states of favoring Germany when this country alone was willing to trade with them and did not demand hard currency payments. Germany bought large quantities of Eastern European products and forced the sellers to buy from her various articles, including gadgets, luxury goods, and many other products, the prices of which were beyond the purchasing power of the buyers.

Antisemitic movements in Eastern Europe often received aid in the form of money from Nazi Germany which practice increased dependence upon that country. Through the various Nazi-supported parties in almost every country and through fifth column organizations, the Germans instigated conflicts between the ruling classes and the dissatisfied social elements. At the same time antibolshevik propaganda was strongly and successfully supported by German diplomacy.

Czechoslovakia, in 1938, was the first to lose her independence. Poland fell in 1939, and Yugoslavia followed in 1941. The years 1939 through 1944 were truly critical for Eastern Europe. The German-Russian imperialistic pincers tightened steadily. Nazi Germany won easy diplomatic victories over the Western European powers whose conciliatory policies were astounding. Even more astounding was their sudden turn to anti-German propaganda and war. Squeezed between the arbitrary policy of the Western powers and the expanding German and Soviet giants, the Eastern European nations had no other choice than to muddle through. Apprehensively watching an alliance of giants and often impressed by the achievements of these powers, they tried to appease them, aid them, or fight them.

Peace economy was turned into war economy. This decreased unemployment, and war losses decreased it even further. The most active age group, already reduced by the slump in birth rate after the First World War, was thinned even more. Youth, accustomed to tackling problems in terms

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tious plans for achieving a bridge to the West via the Scandinavian states, and to create a great Baltic bloc. But the Scandinavian states, at this time, were not entering into the power combinations of Central and Eastern Europe, and the project never got beyond some goodwill tours. Finally, in 1938, Beck, with Ciano, discussed the formation of a Rome-Belgrade-Budapest-Warsaw axis, with the intent of checking German eastward expansion which was now clearly in the offing. But it was very late in the day for such a project, and it never came to any practical fulfillment.

Perhaps the most extensive, although abortive, effort to increase the security of Eastern Europe, this time in conjunction with the great powers, was the French attempt to achieve a so-called Eastern Locarno agreement. The states of Eastern Europe had been understandably disturbed by the Locarno agreements of 1925 which had seemed to settle, by international guarantee, Germany's western frontiers but which had done this at the cost of inviting German revisionism on its eastern frontiers. In 1934-35 France tried to achieve an agreement on the Eastern territorial settlement; Germany, Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic states were to be signatories with France as a guarantor of the treaty. Germany, however, refused to participate. This led to a Polish refusal to underwrite what would then have been an anti-German combination. Eventually the project was reduced to the French-Soviet-Czechoslovakian mutual assistance agreements of 1935, which were clearly something other than a regional organization.

Apart from these various diplomatic combinations, certain other efforts were made to increase the unity of Eastern Europe. Of some interest in this respect is the International Agrarian Bureau, also known as the Green International, founded by leaders of peasant or agrarian parties in a number of Eastern European states in 1921. In its heyday in the 1920's it included peasant parties from Czechoslovakia, Bul-

garia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Austria, Switzerland, Poland, France, the Baltic States, and Finland. The literature of the late 1920's concerning Eastern Europe shows that this peasantist or agrarian movement was widely regarded as the hope of the future. Here was a movement representing a basic common interest of the area and transcending national frontiers.

Unhappily the promise in this movement was never realized, and the movement eventually collapsed. The agrarian parties were not able to dominate the domestic political scene in most of these countries, and the whole position of agriculture was undermined by the advent of the depression in 1929. A governmental effort to organize some defense of agricultural interests was made in 1930 in the form of an agrarian bloc, including Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania. At a number of international conferences and at the League of Nations, this movement attempted to coordinate economic policy and to gain preferential treatment for agricultural exports from the industrial states of Western Europe. This effort achieved nothing tangible, and under the lash of the depression, these states were driven to a policy of *sauve qui peut*.

IV

The depression and the rise of Hitler were undoubtedly the major factors in starting the breakup of whatever cohesion had been achieved in the calmer years of the 1920's. For a time, to be sure, even after Hitler came to power, the Eastern European states showed a good deal of ability to act together. The Little Entente, together with Poland, was largely effective in protesting against the Four-Power Pact of 1933. The extension of the powers of the Little Entente in 1934 and the creation of the Balkan Entente in the same year also showed a positive response to the new dangers. In the false calm of 1934 a number of voices could be heard saying that

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chose to keep Yugoslavia intact by refusing to become a mere instrument of Soviet policy. He undoubtedly saw clearly that the Kremlin took no risks and would certainly get all of the benefits accruing from these political adventures. In the light of Stalin's definition of a true internationalist, this is what the Cominform communiqué meant when it denounced the Communist party of Yugoslavia as identifying "the foreign policy of the Soviet Union with the foreign policy of the imperialist powers," a policy "appropriate only to nationalists."

What effect has Tito's departure from the table of "brotherly Communist parties" had on those parties? Titoism is primarily a matter of loyalties. In Yugoslavia, there was no higher loyalty than to the state personified by Tito himself. Consequently, the party, the army, and the new bureaucracy could and did remain faithful to Tito. If Titoism is to spread, similar conditions and a similar concept of limited loyalty must exist in the people's democracies. To date there is no evidence that Titoism has taken root in the effective leadership circles of the satellite states, since both Western-minded and Moscow-trained Communists have been affected by the purges. Certainly the purges of Communist leaders in satellite Europe which have occurred since 1948 afford no index as to the extent of Titoism. The purgees had no machinery for independence of action available to Tito. Even if they had, it is not sure they would have acted as Tito did if faced with the choice.

What effect has the break had on Yugoslavia itself—on its policies and political philosophy? From the time of the break in June 1948 until November 1949, the Yugoslavs inveighed against the Communist parties of the satellites but not against the sacrosanct personage of Joseph Stalin. The second Cominform meeting held in November 1949 proved quite conclusively to Tito that there were no longer any grounds for conciliation, and he prepared a new political

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425 563 property, the right to travel, and the right to work in desirable occupations, have been dependent not upon a man's diligence, honesty, or thrift, but upon the accident of his affiliations with the group temporarily in power. A man's property and freedom thus came to depend upon the official estimation of his "political reliability" or loyalty, which was defined for him by a rapidly changing sequence of politicians and political regimes. Many of the men who practiced these policies of confiscation and repression considered themselves anti-Communists, or professed themselves as such. Yet in their disregard for property rights and civil liberties they did much to pave the way for Communism.

V

185 668 Perhaps it has been memories of the stagnation under the old empires and the conflict and repressions of the following eras of nationalism that have turned many to visions of a safer, broader, and more generous life under an Eastern European federation.

In the minds of those who accepted this vision, a federation of Eastern European states would offer its peoples military security against invasion by outsiders. It would insure economic prosperity, provide a more stable distribution of economic welfare, safeguard property, provide broader opportunities for all, reward work, thrift, and enterprise, and by all these means serve to insure broad and rapid economic growth. In regard to politics, it would safeguard civil liberties. It would guarantee nondiscriminatory treatment to all peoples and minorities and free mobility to individuals throughout the region. It would assure to both individuals and peoples throughout Eastern Europe respect for their diverse habits and traditions, so that none of them would be forced to change their respective customs, work habits, and social institutions more rapidly or more radically than they might

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freely choose. To ease the complex and subtle problems of culture, emotions, and psychology, it was hoped that the federation would insure widespread opportunities for education. It was hoped that it would give to the inhabitants of the region both social and international prestige. It was hoped that it would bring them to a status of equality with the reference groups which they had chosen as yardsticks for comparison, or that in some way an Eastern European federation would make its citizens the equals not only of the French and German peoples but perhaps in time even of the English and American peoples, who have now become the reference groups for standards of achievement throughout the world. Finally it was hoped that such a federation would give rise to inspiring common enterprises that would unite the peoples of Eastern Europe in a new sense of their own identity, as in past centuries the monarchies of Western Europe, according to the philosopher José Ortega y Gasset, have united their own peoples into a sense of dignity and nationhood.

In striking contrast to the splendor of these visions was their relative poverty in specific detail. None of the larger projects for federation in this region were ever negotiated by governments or even by responsible political leaders from the different areas. There was a negotiated project of the Polish-Czechoslovakian federation, worked out by Czechoslovakian and Polish leaders-in-exile during the Second World War, but this project which included only two states in the region was not followed up by the established governments or by the major political organizations after the war.[3]

[3] Cf. United States Department of State, Division of Library and Reference Services, *Danubian Federation: An Annotated Bibliography* (*Bibliography No. 66*), Washington, D.C., October 28, 1952 (multigraphed); Feliks Gross, *Crossroads of Two Continents: A Democratic Federation of East-Central Europe* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), pp. 28-34, and for the text of the Polish-Czechoslovakian Declaration, signed in London on January 25, 1942, by representatives of the two